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reverse 
Judgment. 
I. Respondent's Request For Attorney Fees Should Be Denied 
In Respondent's Brief, Respondent-Defendant Ronald D. Christian ("Christian"), 
fails to provide a basis for an award of fees on appeal. See Respondent's Brief, p. 5. There 
is no argument or citation to authority supporting the basis for an award of attorney fees. 
See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 874 (1999) (ruling 
"[w]here a party requesting attorney fees on appeal cites the applicable statutes but does 
not present argument with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied on, we 
will not address the request."); Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270 (2009) 
(ruling to be entitled to attorney fees on appeal, authority and argument establishing a right 
to fees must be presented in the first brief filed, mere citation to statute or rules is 
insufficient). 
Second, Molen is requesting this Court to resolve an issue of first impression in this 
case. Cases of first impression do not constitute an area of settled law and therefore an 
is not c,n,'SY'n,,._,., 
V. a a 
malpractice cases prove the additional element actual innocence. Further, Lamb does 
not preclude this Court from adopting exoneration rule. In fact, m 
strongly supports adoption of the "exoneration rule," as discussed in Molen's Opening 
Brief. In this case, there was no objective proof of some actual damage until Molen 
obtained post-conviction relief. 
Yet, Christian argues that this Court's decision in Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 
269 (1996), established that actual innocence is a required element in a criminal legal 
malpractice case. Respondent's Brief, pp. 5-8. This was the position Christian repeatedly 
urged the district court to acknowledge, but the district court repeatedly declined. 
After hearing on Christian's Motion to Dismiss on April 9, 2015, Christian filed a 
Supplemental Authority in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, attaching the Lamb 
v. Manweiler opinion. (R, pp. 74-81). In its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, the district 
court found Lamb "does not identify actual innocence as an element of a legal malpractice 
action arising from representation in a criminal case it just says that element was not in 
dispute in Lamb. (R, p. 87). Next, Christian filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
on procedural Lamb case. pp. 250-58). 
court 
1s an a 
malpractice claim. 
While Christian is correct that the Idaho of that actual 
innocence is an additional element that a plaintiff must prove in a criminal legal malpractice 
case, See Respondent's Motion to Augment Record, Ex. A ("A.R"), p. 6., the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not confirm, affirm, or even address the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
holding on that issue. Rather, the Court's decision in Lamb effectively vacated the Idaho 
Court of Appeals opinion. In fact, the Court's decision was based on the element of 
proximate cause, not actual innocence. After reviewing the record of Lamb's change of 
plea hearing the Court ruled: 
From the transcript of the pleas it is clear that [Lamb] knew the elements 
and knew the facts. He knew that he might have a defense to the charges 
before he pled guilty. He also knew the choice of whether to plead guilty 
was his, not that of his attorney. The choices he had were explained by the 
district judge and acknowledged by Mr. Lamb. The proximate cause of any 
damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty following a 
thorough advice of rights by the district judge concerning the charge. 
Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court's decision granting 
summary judgment to Manweiler, but based its decision on different reasoning. 
contrast to reasoning, both court 
additional element was not disputed by Lamb, at the district court level or on appeal. (R., 
149). However, the Court of Appeals ruled sua sponte that actual was an 
additional element A.R., p. 6. The Court of Appeals found that affidavits attached to 
Lamb's post-conviction proceeding set forth facts that controverted Lamb's guilt and 
created a genuine issue of fact concerning Lamb's actual innocence. Id. at pp. 9-11. 
A review of the three Lamb decisions above demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme 
Court did not confirm that actual innocence is an additional element in a criminal legal 
malpractice case. All three courts based their decisions on distinct reasoning. The district 
court ruled that Lamb failed to establish a genuine issue of fact concerning his innocence, 
and therefore he could not establish the proximate cause element. The Court of Appeals 
ruled that the record contained an issue of material fact concerning Lamb's actual 
innocence, and noted without addressing, that proximate cause is a distinct element. The 
Idaho Supreme Court did not engage in any discussion of Lamb's guilt or innocence, and 
only noted that the element of actual innocence was not in dispute. The Court based its 
decision specificalJy on the element of proximate cause ("The proximate cause of any 
have 
mt,ernret,awm of Lamb v. 
IS decision to plead guilty . s 
4 
a 
"considered but did not adopt the exoneration rule" advanced by Manweiler in his petition 
to the Idaho Supreme Court. Respondent's Brief, 15. While it is correct that Manweiler 
argued for the Court to adopt an exoneration rule, just like the actual innocence element, 
the Court did not address the exoneration rule in its decision. That is because the Court 
made its ruling specifically on the element of proximate cause. More importantly, 
Manweiler raised the exoneration rule issue for the first time in his petition to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. (R., p. 227) ("This defense was not raised as an affirmative defense in 
[Manweiler' s] answer to the complaint ... nor at the summary judgment proceedings ... 
nor, until now, has it been raised as an issue on appeal."). Thus, it was not an issue properly 
before the Court in Lamb, and Christian's assertion that the Court considered but did not 
adopt the exoneration rule is not supported by the facts in that case. 
Next, Christian suggests that an actual innocence requirement and an exoneration 
requirement are mutually exclusive. In his brief he states: 
The distinction is, states such as Idaho require actual innocence as an 
element of proof in an attorney malpractice case, and states that follow the 
exoneration rule require a showing of 'legal' innocence prior to allowing a 
plaintiff to proceed with a malpractice action; thus, exoneration is an 
proof an attorney malpractice case those states. 
Respondent's 
case, an 
5 
(requiring proof legal innocence); Shaw v. State Dep't P.2d 566 
1993) (requiring actual innocence); Therrien v. Sullivan, 891 A.2d 560 (N.H. 2006). In 
fact, in arguing that this Court should adopt the additional element of actual innocence, 
Christian quotes language from Falkner v. Foshaug, 29 P.3d 771 (2001). Respondent's 
Brief, p. 14. In Falkner, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that "both a successful 
postconviction challenge and proof of innocence are necessary to maintain a criminal 
malpractice claim." Id. at 773. 
Based upon the above, Molen submits that the decision in Lamb v. Manweiler does 
not require that a plaintiff in a criminal malpractice cases prove the additional element of 
actual innocence. Further, the decision in Lamb does not preclude this Court from adopting 
the exoneration rule. 
III. Molen's Cause Of Action Did Not Accrue Until He Was Granted Post-
Conviction Relief 
Molen maintains his position that his cause of action against Christian did not 
accrue until Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014. Molen filed his 
Compliant on February 1 2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations. 
Christian contends that Molen had objective proof of damage when he was 
convicted and sentenced in his criminal case. Respondent's p. 17. According to 
"Molen on 
was granted caused damage, since the time he 
6 
actual H~ . -,~-u,,-
crime and that Christian's ineffective assistance resulted in Molen' s conviction. That is to 
Molen was aware of Christian's negligent acts to being granted post-conviction 
relief by Judge Owen. However, as the district court correctly stated: "it is not necessarily 
just the negligent act of the attorney which starts the accrual of the statute of limitations. 
There may be some external act after the fact which actually starts accrual." (R., p. 92). 
(quoting and analyzing Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 
868 (2015)). 
Second, Judge Owen's decision granting Molen's petition for post-conviction relief 
has substantial bearing on this case. When Judge Owen granted Molen' s petition Molen 
had established his legal innocence of the crime. Molen' s action for criminal legal 
malpractice did not accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, until he successfully 
obtained post-conviction relief. Prior to that date, there was no objective proof of some 
actual damage. See Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221 (1992). As recognized by the district 
court, (R., p. 6; R., p. 354), the exoneration rule is an issue of first impression in Idaho. 
In this case, there was no objective proof of some actual damage until Molen 
post-conviction This is within two 
Molen submits that a material issue of fact exists 
obtained some 
7 
statute of limitations. 
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